Published on August 31, 2026<\/p>\n<\/div>
Imagine you have three qualified suppliers for a critical component.
\nThree contracts. Three companies. Three supposedly independent sources of supply.
\nThen a manufacturer drops out, with whom you don't even have a contract \u2013 and suddenly all three can no longer deliver.<\/p>\n
This, in my opinion, is one of the most dangerous misunderstandings in supply chain risk management:
\nMultiple suppliers do not automatically mean multiple independent supply chains.<\/p>\n
Because different Tier 1 suppliers may have the same raw material sources, production sites, specialist manufacturers or sub-suppliers.
\nOn paper, this looks like diversification. In reality, it can be a single, concentrated risk.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the resilience of a supply chain does not depend on how many suppliers a company has, but rather on how many truly independent supply routes exist for critical parts and materials.<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div> We usually know our direct suppliers quite well. We evaluate quality and delivery reliability, monitor their financial situation, and are familiar with their locations, contracts, and contact persons.<\/p>\n One step lower and the image quickly becomes blurry.<\/p>\n A recent McKinsey survey clearly demonstrates this: 95 percent of the companies surveyed have insight into the risks of their Tier 1 suppliers. For Tier 2 and above, this figure drops to 42 percent or less.McKinsey & Company<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div> That's precisely where the crucial risk lies. A small specialist manufacturer with a comparatively low purchasing volume can paralyze an entire production if its product is irreplaceable.<\/b><\/p>\n Therefore, a common way of thinking in purchasing falls short: That may well be true. But purchasing volume and system criticality are not the same thing.<\/p>\n How quickly a hidden dependency can become a real problem was demonstrated in 2025 by the Chinese export restrictions on rare earths and magnets. European automotive suppliers had to partially halt production lines due to a lack of materials. Mercedes-Benz subsequently discussed risks and potential buffer stocks with its supplier network across Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 levels.Reuters<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/div> The critical point in a supply chain is not necessarily where we buy our products. It can be two or three steps earlier.<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div> When a risk is identified, one of the first demands is often: We need a second supplier.<\/p>\n This is fundamentally sensible. However, a second-source strategy only truly increases resilience if it also creates an independent supply route.<\/p>\n If supplier A and supplier B source the same critical raw material from the same manufacturer, or depend on the same production site or region, both will remain dependent on the same bottleneck.<\/p>\n Therefore, the crucial question is not: Do we have a second supplier?<\/p>\n Rather: Do we have a second, truly independent supply chain?<\/b><\/p>\n At Emarticon, we therefore deliberately track risks across multiple delivery stages in critical cases. In high-tech projects, we have even gone as far as sub-sub-suppliers. Our approach to supply chain risk management takes into account locations, sub-suppliers and the importance of individual supplier parts.<\/b><\/p>\n However, I also learned that it's easy to get lost in this analysis.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div> A complex supply chain can encompass thousands of companies. I believe that attempting to make every Tier 2, Tier 3, or Tier 4 supplier completely transparent is neither realistic nor sensible for many companies.<\/p>\n Therefore, I would not start with the supplier network, but with the potential damage:<\/p>\n Which parts, materials, or services could actually jeopardize production, customer deliveries, or significant revenues? Where does technical substitution or qualification take a particularly long time?<\/p>\n I would dig deeper into these critical paths.<\/p>\n Four questions are crucial for me:<\/b><\/p>\n Not only in Tier 1, but along the entire relevant supply chain.<\/b><\/p>\n Same material? Same subcontractor? Same region? Same production site?<\/b><\/p>\n Are there alternative materials, manufacturers, or technologies? And how long would it take to actually be able to use them?<\/b><\/p>\n Because transparency alone does not make a supply chain resilient.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div> Once a critical bottleneck has been identified, the real work begins.<\/p>\n Depending on the risk, additional sources of supply, alternative materials, modified specifications, buffer stocks, other production sites or contractually secured capacities may be useful.<\/p>\n There is no standard solution for this. But there should be a concrete answer to the question: What do we do if precisely this dependency fails tomorrow?<\/b><\/p>\n A risk analysis without actionable insights initially only creates more knowledge about one's own risk. Resilience only arises when this knowledge is transformed into real alternatives.<\/p>\n Therefore, I wouldn't ask at the end: How many suppliers do we have? Because three suppliers can mean three options. \ud83d\udc49<\/b> <\/b>More on this topic:\u201cThe Unknown\u201d: The blind spot behind Tier 1<\/h3><\/div><\/div><\/div>
![\"SCM-Risiko-Management\"](\"https:\/\/emarticon.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/9-Impuls-Foto.png\")
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\nHigh spending means high risk.<\/p>\nSecond Source is not automatically Second Supply Chain<\/h3><\/div>
Don't map everything \u2013 understand the critical paths<\/h3><\/div>
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Transparency must lead to alternatives<\/h3><\/div>
\n<\/b>But rather: How many truly independent supply chains do we have for what is critical to our business?<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>
\nOr the same dependency three times over.<\/p>\n<\/div>
\nHow Emarticon helps companies combine security of supply and efficiency in supply chain management:
\n\u2192 Supply chain risk management<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>