Published on August 31, 2026
Imagine you have three qualified suppliers for a critical component.
Three contracts. Three companies. Three supposedly independent sources of supply.
Then a manufacturer drops out, with whom you don't even have a contract – and suddenly all three can no longer deliver.
This, in my opinion, is one of the most dangerous misunderstandings in supply chain risk management:
Multiple suppliers do not automatically mean multiple independent supply chains.
Because different Tier 1 suppliers may have the same raw material sources, production sites, specialist manufacturers or sub-suppliers.
On paper, this looks like diversification. In reality, it can be a single, concentrated risk.
Therefore, the resilience of a supply chain does not depend on how many suppliers a company has, but rather on how many truly independent supply routes exist for critical parts and materials.
“The Unknown”: The blind spot behind Tier 1
We usually know our direct suppliers quite well. We evaluate quality and delivery reliability, monitor their financial situation, and are familiar with their locations, contracts, and contact persons.
One step lower and the image quickly becomes blurry.
A recent McKinsey survey clearly demonstrates this: 95 percent of the companies surveyed have insight into the risks of their Tier 1 suppliers. For Tier 2 and above, this figure drops to 42 percent or less.McKinsey & Company)
That's precisely where the crucial risk lies. A small specialist manufacturer with a comparatively low purchasing volume can paralyze an entire production if its product is irreplaceable.
Therefore, a common way of thinking in purchasing falls short:
High spending means high risk.
That may well be true. But purchasing volume and system criticality are not the same thing.
How quickly a hidden dependency can become a real problem was demonstrated in 2025 by the Chinese export restrictions on rare earths and magnets. European automotive suppliers had to partially halt production lines due to a lack of materials. Mercedes-Benz subsequently discussed risks and potential buffer stocks with its supplier network across Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 levels.Reuters)
The critical point in a supply chain is not necessarily where we buy our products. It can be two or three steps earlier.
Second Source is not automatically Second Supply Chain
When a risk is identified, one of the first demands is often: We need a second supplier.
This is fundamentally sensible. However, a second-source strategy only truly increases resilience if it also creates an independent supply route.
If supplier A and supplier B source the same critical raw material from the same manufacturer, or depend on the same production site or region, both will remain dependent on the same bottleneck.
Therefore, the crucial question is not: Do we have a second supplier?
Rather: Do we have a second, truly independent supply chain?
At Emarticon, we therefore deliberately track risks across multiple delivery stages in critical cases. In high-tech projects, we have even gone as far as sub-sub-suppliers. Our approach to supply chain risk management takes into account locations, sub-suppliers and the importance of individual supplier parts.
However, I also learned that it's easy to get lost in this analysis.
Don't map everything – understand the critical paths
A complex supply chain can encompass thousands of companies. I believe that attempting to make every Tier 2, Tier 3, or Tier 4 supplier completely transparent is neither realistic nor sensible for many companies.
Therefore, I would not start with the supplier network, but with the potential damage:
Which parts, materials, or services could actually jeopardize production, customer deliveries, or significant revenues? Where does technical substitution or qualification take a particularly long time?
I would dig deeper into these critical paths.
Four questions are crucial for me:
- Where can a single failure stop our value creation?
Not only in Tier 1, but along the entire relevant supply chain.
- Do supposedly independent suppliers share the same dependencies?
Same material? Same subcontractor? Same region? Same production site?
- How replaceable is the critical node?
Are there alternative materials, manufacturers, or technologies? And how long would it take to actually be able to use them?
- What option do we have if this node fails?
Because transparency alone does not make a supply chain resilient.
Transparency must lead to alternatives
Once a critical bottleneck has been identified, the real work begins.
Depending on the risk, additional sources of supply, alternative materials, modified specifications, buffer stocks, other production sites or contractually secured capacities may be useful.
There is no standard solution for this. But there should be a concrete answer to the question: What do we do if precisely this dependency fails tomorrow?
A risk analysis without actionable insights initially only creates more knowledge about one's own risk. Resilience only arises when this knowledge is transformed into real alternatives.
Therefore, I wouldn't ask at the end: How many suppliers do we have?
But rather: How many truly independent supply chains do we have for what is critical to our business?
Because three suppliers can mean three options.
Or the same dependency three times over.
👉 More on this topic:
How Emarticon helps companies combine security of supply and efficiency in supply chain management:
→ Supply chain risk management
Do you want to make purchasing and supply chain a key factor for success?
I would be happy to discuss your specific situation with you in a personal conversation.